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Abstract: How does technological innovation emerge and evolve? We approach such an inquiry 
by synthesizing the perspectives of dynamic capabilities and co-evolutionary dynamics to portray 
organizational routines and multi-phase strategic renewals of an emerging technology-leader. To 
untangle the emergence of technological innovation, we conducted a longitudinal case study on 
the first and the largest dedicated semiconductor foundry, TSMC, located in the emerging 
economy of Taiwan. The firm-case of TSMC illustrates two unique co-evolutionary paths, that is, 
transforming from industry-latecomer to technology-leader and from process innovation to 
product innovation. We found multi-motor co-evolutionary dynamics between TSMC and the 
semiconductor industry, where its co-evolutionary mechanism of managed selection in its creating 
phase of mature process-innovation (1987-1998) has migrated to hierarchical renewal in its 
extending phase of advanced process-innovation (1999-2001), and then to holistic renewal in its 
modifying phase of product-innovation (2002-2007). During such paths, our research discovered a 
unique type of organizational routines, acting what’s next because TSMC has proactively searched 
for potential problems sooner than its competitors. However, such routines, although driving 
technological innovation, also lead to a unique type of success-trap, that is, speeding trap. When 
an emerging technology-leader fundamentally changes the industrial structures to over-specs, the 
growth driven by technology speeding may trap such a leader in a loop of over-exploration. 
JEL Classifications: O33, O53, L63 
Keywords: dynamic capabilities, emerging economies, organizational routine, strategic renewal, 
technological innovation 
1. Introduction 
The objective of this study was to untangle the inquiry, how technological innovation emerges and 
evolves. Although Schumpeter’s argument that the prime driver of economic development is 
technological innovation instead of perfect competition is seldom disputed (Schumpeter, 1942; 
Van de Ven, 1996), most organizations encounter barriers that defeat their attempts at innovation. 
In particular, organizations must change when they innovate (Tushman & Anderson, 2004). 
Therefore, we conducted a longitudinal case study on an emerging leader to investigate how an 
organization co-evolve with its industry, when actively adapting to macro and micro changes and 
consequently reshaping the industrial landscape by multi-phase technological innovation. 
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Based on the assertion that strategy is crucial during times of change, the theorists of dynamic 
capabilities posit that organizations must actively adapt to and exploit changes in their business 
environment, and proactively seek opportunities to create changes through technological, 
organizational, or strategic innovation (Helfat, Finkelstein, Mitchell, Peteraf, Singh, Teece, & 
Winter, 2007). Following this argument from the perspective of dynamic capabilities, we analyzed 
the emerging and evolving processes of technological innovation of a semiconductor leader 
located in an emerging economy, which transferred its core competence from, and then 
out-performed, its co-founder located in an advanced economy.  
Three aspects of exploring the emergence and evolution of innovation have not been fully 
addressed in the related literature, which strongly motivated our research. In brief, the literature 
regarding dynamic capabilities and technological innovation has relatively emphasized outcomes, 
contents, and purposeful changes. By contrast, this study demonstrated the antecedents, processes, 
and co-evolutionary emergence of technological innovation with an emphasis on organizational 
routines. However, it remains challenging to choose an appropriate research methodology, 
particularly on the emergence of innovation. Such a challenge lies in the attempt to make the 
implicit organization-specific mechanisms explicit by emphasizing the emerging antecedents and 
co-evolutionary processes. Moreover, the forming processes and transformation mechanisms are 
relatively less observed and analyzed than the components and outcomes of technological 
innovation. Therefore, we used the qualitative approach to examine an in-depth case of an 
emerging technology-leader.  
In short, we attempt to explain, rather than to predict, the emergence and evolution of 
technological innovation from the analytical view of co-evolutionary dynamic capabilities. Based 
on a longitudinal case study of an innovative organization, our research specified the 
organization-specific mechanisms of sequential strategic renewals induced from the macro 
co-evolutionary dynamics of a technology-latecomer transforming to industry-leader, as well as 
the micro co-evolutionary dynamics of organizational routines transforming from 
process-innovation to product-innovation. Consequently, this study offers practical contributions 
in reducing the barriers to imitate, innovate, and change. The following sections tell a story about 
the macro and micro co-evolutionary dynamics of a semiconductor firm and its industrial 
environment. Our research journey has inaugurated from literature review, methodology, analysis 
and discussion, and then concluded with research contributions and managerial implications. 
2. Literature Review 
Highlighting our research motivation, we conducted reviews on the literature of the dynamic 
capabilities, co-evolutionary dynamics, and the organizational routines for technological 
innovation.  
2.1 Dynamic Capabilities 
Our first research motivation was to redirect research attention from outcomes to the antecedents 
of dynamic capabilities. The perspective of dynamic capabilities (Teece, Pisano, & Shuen, 1997) 
combines the resource-based view (Barney, 1991) and the evolutionary theory (Nelson & Winter, 
1982). In principle, our research follows the mainstream definition of a dynamic capability as the 
capacity of an organization to purposefully create, extend, or modify its resource base (Helfat et 
al., 2007). However, the organizational mechanisms to transform its resource base to a dynamic 
capability remain unclear. Since the article by Teece, Pisano, & Shuen (1997), the literature on 
dynamic capabilities has focused on their implications to organizational performance, such as the 
strategy-content school (Helfat et al., 2007).  
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By contrast, our search for the emergence of technological innovation attempted to turn the focus 
backward to the formation and transformation of dynamic capabilities. We argue that dynamic 
capabilities are crucial when an organization is adapting to a complex system, instead of a rational 
equilibrium. Sharing the assumption of bounded rationality as behavior economists (Cyert & 
March, 1963), some scholars from the perspective of dynamic capabilities indicated the effects of 
“bounded predictability” (Witt, 2005) on the development of dynamic capabilities. For example, 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) contrasted the nature of dynamic capabilities in moderately 
dynamic markets and high-velocity markets as detailed, analytic, and stable routines with 
predictable outcomes versus experiential and fragile processes with unpredictable outcomes. 
Sharing the assertion of bounded predictability in high-velocity markets, we argue that an 
organization may proactively develop its innovation routines to cope with unpredictable 
outcomes. 
2.2 Co-Evolutionary Dynamics 
Our second motivation was to expand the definition of dynamic capability driven by purposeful 
changes into evolutionary emergence with an emphasis on routines. Astley and Van de Ven (1983) 
classified the diverse schools of organizational thoughts as micro versus macro levels of 
organizational analysis, and as deterministic versus voluntaristic assumptions of human nature to 
yield four basis perspectives, as follows: system-structure, strategic choice, natural selection, and 
collective-action views of organizations. Among these four perspectives, we argue that the 
perspective of dynamic capabilities aligns with the voluntaristic orientation at micro level, and is 
accordingly classified as strategic choice view, which is attributed as autonomous behavior and 
proactive management. However, when incorporating the macro level of organization population, 
the literature has not fully examined whether micro proactive and reactive changes co-evolve with 
macro structures.  
The extensive selection-adaptation literature spans diverse theoretical perspectives; however, is 
inconclusive on the role of managerial intentionality in organizational adaptation (Volberda & 
Lewin, 2003). Therefore, recent research has introduced the inter-organizational perspective into 
evolutionary theory by illustrating the co-evolutionary dynamics of organizational capabilities and 
industrial competition (Huygens, Baden-Fuller, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2001). Volberda and 
Lewin (2003) proposed an over-arching framework to expand the evolutionary perspective from 
organizational-level to multi-levels analysis as co-evolutionary dynamics within and between 
firms. Based on various levels of managerial intentionality, Volberda and Lewin (2003) identified 
four co-evolutionary mechanisms to demonstrate the range of evolutionary paths, including naïve 
selection, managed selection, hierarchical renewal, and holistic renewal. Among these four 
mechanisms, the managed selection co-evolutionary path requires continuous attention to the 
reflection and refreshing of routines (Lewin & Volberda, 2003; Volberda & Lewin, 2003). In brief, 
the co-evolutionary perspective emphasizes proactive managerial intentionality and the role of 
routines, which is consistent with our research motivations.  
Although scholars have applied such co-evolutionary lens to empirical researches, rare studies 
addressed multi-levels nor multi-motors co-evolutionary paths as our research. Rather than 
applying the perspective of dynamic capabilities as this study, some multi-level studies have 
integrated the network and evolutionary perspectives, such as co-evolution of entrepreneurs' 
social networks and entrepreneurial processes in the Chinese context (Guo & Miller, 2010), as 
well as the impacts of Japanese horizontal and vertical business networks as underlying interfirm 
mechanisms on firm innovation (Zhang & Cantwell, 2011). Specifically at the macro level, most 
studies have discussed co-evolutionary dynamics between firms and national institutions, 
including keiretsu networks in Japan (Cantwell & Zhang, 2006) and business system in China 
(Chen, 2007; Krug & Hendrischke, 2008), as well as between technologies and institutions, 
including hard disk drive and liquid crystal display industries in Taiwan (Hung, 2002). 
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Specifically at the micro level, some scholars applied both perspectives of evolutionary and 
dynamic capabilities, in the empirical context of Mexican firms (Dutrénit, 2007) and Korean 
giant, Samsung (Lee & He, 2009) to describe evolutionary changes of intra-organizational core 
capabilities. In brief, most empirical studies concentrated on one level or the macro level of 
national institutions, rather than the co-evolutionary dynamics between the focal organization and 
its industrial environment as our study. 
In view of the shifting focus from evolution to co-evolution, Volberda and Lewin (2003) 
specifically requested longitudinal research on how an organization and its industry co-evolve by 
several renewal engines. While focusing on managerial innovations, Damanpour and Aravind 
highlighted that the importance of both technological and managerial innovations and the need 
for their coexistence and co-evolution for economic growth (Damanpour & Aravind, 2011). 
Applying such a view of co-evolutionary dynamic capabilities, we further demonstrated the 
interactions between proactive changes of managers and their reactions to adapt to environmental 
changes through sequential strategic renewals of an emerging technology-leader. Strategic 
renewal refers to crucial strategic changes preceded by internal experimentation and selection 
(Burgelman, Christensen, & Wheelwright, 2004; Crossan & Berdrow, 2003). 
2.3 Organizational Routines for Technological Innovation 
Our third motivation was to focus more on the process aspect than the content aspect of strategy. 
Conventionally, the mainstream strategy scholars assumed that strategy is something that 
organizations have. By contrast, the scholars promoting ‘strategy as practice’ have a different 
perspective, that is, strategy is something that people undertake, or ‘an activity’ (Johanson, 
Langley, Melin, & Whittington, 2007). In the article, “Dynamic Capabilities: What are they,” 
Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) defined dynamic capabilities as a set of specific and identifiable 
processes. They argued that dynamic capabilities have significant commonalities across firms, 
which is popularly termed ‘best practice,’ although dynamic capabilities are idiosyncratic in their 
details and path dependent in their emergence. Based on their argument, however, the reasons 
why some best practices are relatively easier to imitate, whereas others are more difficult remain 
unclear, especially when organizations located in emerging economies engaging in unpredictable 
innovation.  
In “The Theory of Economic Development,” Schumpeter defined technological innovation as the 
development of new ideas into marketable products and processes, and separated the 
technological change process into three sequential stages: invention, innovation, and diffusion 
(Schumpeter, 1934). Various types of innovation have been identified in the literature, such as 
incremental versus radical, and product versus process (Burgelman et al., 2004). This study 
applied Porter’s distinction between product-innovation, product design to enhance quality and 
features to meet customer requirements, and process-innovation, process development to tune the 
production and delivery system to improve performance (Porter, 1983). 
Our research highlights the role of routines in organizational change (Feldman, 2000) and more 
specifically the co-evolutionary dynamics of organizational learning versus unlearning (Akgün, 
Byrne, Lynn, & Keskin, 2007) in technological innovation. Routines are defined as regular and 
predictable behavioral patterns of organizations by a behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & 
March, 1963) and the evolutionary theory of economic change (Nelson & Winter, 1982), which 
indicate that an organization is a collection of routines for responding and adapting to its 
environments. Although identifying the critical role of routines in breeding innovation, both 
theories suggested different concepts of routine change. Whereas Cyert and March (1963) 
regarded routine change as adaptation, Nelson and Winter (1982) called it mutation, especially 
evident in the advent of a crisis. Both have not fully addressed how an organization to design its 
new routines or change its existing routines for adapting proactively. Therefore, whether, or 
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indeed how, organizational routines themselves may also be developed as outcomes of innovation 
has not yet been theoretically discussed and empirically examined. 
3. Method 
Methodologically, the inductive method is more common in strategy process research, in which 
case-based methods have been suggested as a more appropriate approach (Helfat et al., 2007). 
Specifically, we selected Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC, hereafter), the 
world’s largest semiconductor manufacturing service, as an intentional sample (Eisenhardt, 1989) 
of one corporate setting (Burgelman, 1994; Burgelman, 2002; Cherry, 2003; Yin, 2002). Our data 
collection includes not only archival and interview data about TSMC, but also comparisons with 
its major foundry-competitor, United Microelectronics Corporation (UMC, hereafter) in Taiwan. 
3.1 TSMC Case Background 
TSMC was founded in 1987 as an international joint venture of ITRI (Industrial Technology 
Research Institute), a Taiwanese government-sponsored agency, and Philips, the Dutch 
technology-leader (Wen & Lee, 2012). TSMC is the world's first firm establishing a pure-play 
foundry, specializing in manufacturing semiconductor products based on designs provided by its 
up-stream customers, fabless firms. Ever since its establishment, TSMC has successfully 
maintained its leading position in the foundry sub-industry either in terms of technology or 
revenues. Although initially as a technology-latecomer, it only took TSMC 15 years to become 
one the top-ten semiconductor firm, which has surpassed its technology founder, Philips, since 
2002. TSMC in Taiwan and Samsung in Korea are the only two semiconductor firms rooted in 
emerging economies that have achieved the extraordinary transition from a latecomer to a leader 
(ITIS, 2001-2008; Mathews & Cho, 1999). Moreover, among the top-ten semiconductor firms, 
TSMC is the only one foundry provider, and the other nine leaders, including Samsung, all adopt 
the mainstream business-model of IDM (Integrated Device Manufacturer), meaning that they 
design, manufacture, and sell their own integrated circuit (IC) products to down-stream 
customers, electronic system-providers.  
We selected TSMC as an intentional case because of the following three reasons. First, the 
semiconductor industry is characterized as technology-intensive due to its rapid changes in 
technology. Scholars define technology-intensive firms as those which require complex 
coordination of knowledge and activities more generally (Helfat & Raubitschek, 2000). Following 
Moore’s law (Moore, 1965) as a self-fulfilling prophecy, the semiconductor industry has regularly 
developed next-generational technologies to manufacture larger-sized wafers with increasingly 
higher circuit resolutions (TSMC, 2000~2006). Second, as a new business-model of pure-play 
foundry, TSMC enjoys a unique technological scope by specializing in process-innovation, rather 
than product-innovation, which IDM players are committed to. Such unique evolutionary paths 
for TSMC transforming from a latecomer to a leader and extending from process-innovation to 
product-innovation may generate useful lessons for other latecomers who are striving for 
innovation in emerging economies (Meyer, 2006; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, & Peng, 2005). 
Moreover, some scholars specifically highlight that the corporate renewal of technology industries 
is an increasingly important part of many emerging economies (Bruton, Dess, & Janney, 2007; 
Bruton & Rubanik, 2002). Third, the interactions between TSMC and the semiconductor industry 
provide an applicable empirical context for studying the co-evolutionary dynamics. From a macro 
perspective, TSMC has initiated two critical types of routinized innovation, which have 
fundamentally changed the landscape of the semiconductor industry. TSMC’s pure-foundry model 
has accelerated the disintegration trend of the semiconductor industry, including fabless firms (IC 
design), packaging and testing firms in the 1990s, and design-service and SIP (Silicon Intellectual 
Property) firms in 2000s. Moreover, TSMC’s aggressive capacity expansion supported by its 
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leading position in advanced process-technologies has pushed more IDMs as Intel to outsource 
their manufacturing to pure-foundry, and some even to convert their business-model from IDM to 
fabless as AMD. Therefore, TSMC’s extension from process to product-innovation manifested 
another unique co-evolutionary dynamics between intra-organizational and trans-organizational 
innovation (Millar, Demaid, & Quintas, 1997). As a electronic component-manufacturer, TSMC 
has to co-develop semiconductor products with its fabless customers; and as a 
government-initiated enterprise located in the Hsin-chu Industrial Park, it has also collaborated 
with other on-park firms and universities for knowledge exchange (Chan, Oerlemans, & Pretorius, 
2010; Malairaja & Zawdie, 2008).  
3.2 Fieldwork and Data Collection 
Our fieldwork of interviews and analysis was carried out during 2006 and 2008. In addition to 
archival data, mostly in Chinese (ITIS, 2001-2008; Mathews, 1997; Shih, 2003), two cases on 
TSMC published by Harvard Business School ( Iansiti & Strojwas, 2003) and Stanford Graduate 
School of Business (Shneorson, Lee, & Whang, 2006) provided the historical background for 
TSMC’s distributed innovation with its partners and for its e-foundry program.  
Confined by concerns with confidentiality about innovation activities, we eventually completed 
15 interviews sessions. All interviewees requested to remain anonymous. Each interview lasted 
from one to two hours. The profile of our interviewees included 7 TSMC employees, 3 UMC 
employees, and 5 TSMC partners. Due to TSMC’s practice of cross-functional transfer, 7 TSMC 
interviewees in fact covered multi-level and multi-functional perspectives, including engineer, 
director, vice president, and senior vice president of R&D; the quality and reliability engineering 
function; manager of design service, financial and sales, as well as manager and vice president of 
marketing. The profile of the UMC interviewees covered executives of R&D, financial as well as 
IC design functions. Further, the interviewed TSMC partners included executives of an EDA 
(Electronic Design Automation) supplier, two fabless customers, a venture capitalist, an 
ex-chairman of ITRI, which is the local founder of TSMC. 
4. Analyses and Discussion 
To provide empirical evidence of the emergence and evolution of technological innovation, our 
research framework incorporated both macro and micro levels of analysis on co-evolutionary 
dynamics between the semiconductor industry and TSMC. Based on the macro co-evolutionary 
paths of TSMC transforming from technology-latecomer to industry-leader of semiconductors, we 
found three sequential strategic renewals embedded with three co-evolutionary motors. At the 
micro level, the TSMC case revealed that it proactively renewed its organizational routines to 
speed its development of next-generation technologies, and modified its dynamic capabilities 
from process-innovation to product-innovation. Accordingly, we inductively specified a unique 
type of routine as acting what’s next and a unique type of success trap as speeding trap.  
Proposing further research regarding migration from evolution to co-evolution, Volberda and 
Lewin (2003) proposed a motor for each of the four co-evolutionary mechanisms, as follows: 
bVcSR (blind variation, competitive selection, retention) driving naïve selection, and dVvSR 
(deliberate variation, vicarious selection, retention) driving managed selection, administrative 
motor driving hierarchical renewal, and collective sense making driving holistic renewal. 
Specifically on the empirical context of emerging economies, some scholars have adopted such 
co-evolutionary lens to study the state-business relations in Korea (Cherry, 2003) and interfirm 
networks on the internationalization process of Taiwanese small and medium enterprises (SMEs) 
(Lin & Chaney, 2007). Based on this perspective of co-evolution, we found unique multi-motor 
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paths of TSMC through three sequential strategic renewals for technological innovation, as 
illustrated in Table 1.  
Table 1. TSMC’s multi-phase and multi-motor co-evolutionary dynamics 
Strategic  Creating Phase Extending Phase Modifying Phase 
Renewal 1987˜˜1998 1999˜2001 2002˜2007 
Co-evolutionary 
Path 
Managed Selection Hierarchical Renewal Holistic Renewal 
Co-evolutionary 
Motor 
dVvSR (deliberate 
variation, vicarious 
selection, retention) 
Administrative Collective Sense-making 
Innovation 
Strategy 
 
Mature 
Process-innovation 
Advanced 
Process-innovation 
Product-innovation 
Innovation 
Routines ** 
1. To transfer mature 
technology from its 
foreign founder – 
Philips 
2. To transfer fab-facility 
and teams from its local 
founder – ITRI 
3. To transform its 
business-model to 
eFoundry  
4. To catch up ITRS 
roadmap* by 
operational 
improvements 
1. To recruit R&D talents 
from the technology 
leaders  
2. To proactively search 
for problems for 
detecting potential 
defects as early as 
possible  
3. To co-develop with 
customers and suppliers  
1. To extend monitoring 
system in R&D lines  
2. To timely deliver by 
end-to-end coordination  
3. To smoothly hand-over 
by side-by-side 
collaboration  
4. To allocate less 
resources in operational 
improvements 
5. To create problems 
when 
process-technology over 
design-specs  
6. To convert design 
service to IP house to 
cope with the curse of 
economy of scale 
(drifting out of foundry) 
Note*: ITRS (International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors) roadmap is the 
fifteen-year assessment of the future technology requirements of the semiconductor industry 
Note**: Please refer to Appendixes 1a, 1b, 2, 3a, 3b for details of innovation routines. 
4.1 Sequential Strategic Renewals 
Following the definition of a dynamic capability as the capacity to purposefully create, extend, or 
modify its resource base (Helfat et al., 2007), this study specified the organizational life-cycle as 
three consecutive phases of creating, extending, and modifying. We found multi-motor 
co-evolutionary dynamics between TSMC and the semiconductor industry, where its 
co-evolutionary mechanism of managed selection in its creating phase of mature 
process-innovation (1987-1998) has migrated to hierarchical renewal in its extending phase of 
advanced process-innovation (1999-2001), and then to holistic renewal in its modifying phase of 
product-innovation (2002-2007). Each strategic renewal was initiated at the start of a radical 
change of technological innovation. The first renewal of TSMC was initiated as creating the first 
dedicated Semiconductor foundry in the world in 1987. The second started as declining the 
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technology-transfer of IBM when TSMC extended from a technology-latecomer focusing on 
mature process-innovation toward industry-leader focusing on advanced process-innovation in 
1999. The third started as launching TSMC’s first advanced-platform of 0.13-micron platform 
when modifying its innovation strategy from process-innovation to product-innovation in 2002.  
The critical event dividing those sequential renewals and multi-motor paths was the decision by 
TSMC to self-develop its first advanced-technological platform during 1999 and 2001. Our 
research specifies the technology to manufacture IC on a larger-size wafer as disruptive 
(Christensen, 1997), because all of the equipment and the process-specs (recipes) must be 
re-designed to accommodate new wafer-size, which is usually associated with higher circuit 
resolution, more functionality, lower average cost driven by the economy of scale, and higher 
selling price per die. The technology platform has migrated from the aluminum-interconnect with 
the resolution-nodes lower than 0.15 micron on 8-inch wafer to the copper-interconnect and 
low-K technologies with the resolution-nodes higher than 0.13 micron on 12-inch wafer since 
2002.  
4.2 Managed Selection in Creating Phase (1987~1998) 
During its creating phase, TSMC co-evolved with the semiconductor industry as the path of 
managed selection driven by the motor of deliberate variation, vicarious selection, and retention 
of its founding chairman, Dr. Morris Chang. In 1987, believing that a dedicated foundry was the 
only opportunity for a latecomer of an emerging economy to substantially grow the 
semiconductor industry, Dr. Chang persuaded both the government of Taiwan and Philips 
Semiconductor to realize such a vision. In brief, Dr. Chang’s foresight of the foundry 
business-model has framed the evolutionary paths of TSMC since its inception. In 1997, Dr. 
Chang foresaw the future trend in the Internet era, that is, a virtual fab called eFoundry. 
Together with the top management team, he led an organizational renewal initiative to transform 
TSMC from a manufacturing-oriented to service-oriented organization at the micro level, and 
modified the foundry business-model into virtual IDM at the macro level. Powered by a 
collection of Internet-based programs that allowed customers and TSMC to virtually integrated 
in design, logistics, and engineering, eFoundry functions as an in-house fab for its customers 
(Shneorson et al., 2006).  
As a latecomer, TSMC had to catch up its one-year lag behind the technology leaders and to 
maintain its cost-advantage. In its creating phase, TSMC co-developed innovation routines with 
its founders and customers, regarding facility transfer, technology transfer, and design-recipes, 
for incrementally improving manufacturing yield through mature process-technology.  
4.3 Hierarchical Renewal in Extending Phase (1999~2001) 
We specified the extending phase of TSMC as hierarchical renewal driven by the administrative 
motor during 1999-2001. In 1999, the technology leader of IBM Microelectronics offered the 
latecomers of TSMC and subsequently UMC an opportunity to transfer its proprietary 
next-generational technologies via silk material to manufacture 12-inch wafer. Facing such a 
dilemma of co-developing as a follower versus self-developing as a leader, these two competing 
latecomers made contrasting decisions, the consequences of which were critical turning points for 
their future competitiveness. After a one-year evaluation, TSMC declined the offer from IBM and 
then successfully developed multiple platforms with its equipment supplier, Applied Materials. 
Aiming to overthrow the leading position of TSMC, UMC paid IBM a licensing fee of USD 100 
million, and relocated approximately 50 R&D engineers from Hsin-chu in Taiwan to the IBM Lab 
in Fishkill in the U.S. in 2000. In such an innovation race, the alliance of IBM and UMC ramped 
up the production line of 0.13-micron nearly one year later than TSMC.  
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In this extending phase, TSMC developed four major routines to transform from latecomer to 
leader in advanced process-technologies. First, to expand its organizational slack (Cyert & March, 
1963), TSMC aggressively recruited experienced R&D talents from the industry-leaders to lead a 
large new Ph.D. crew. For example, its R&D team successfully test-ran a preliminary recipe of 
copper-interconnect on the 0.18-micron node by the end of 1998. This achievement of 
independent R&D supported its decision to decline the offer from IBM, and our proposition that 
the accumulated slack bred capability renewals. Second, by declining the learning opportunity 
from IBM, TSMC renewed its innovation aspiration from technology transfer to leading 
development. Third, to exploit matured process-technologies, TSMC mobilized both R&D and 
other function-units to proactively search for problems, functioning as a wide-range radar screen 
to detect potential defects as early as possible by exposing the operational teams in diversified 
design-recipes even during the R&D phase. Fourth, to explore the future recipes, TSMC 
proactively searched for the emerging customers and suppliers to co-develop the 
next-generational equipment and design-specs.  
4.3.1 Acting What’s next 
We observed a unique type of routines, acting what’s next, because TSMC proactively searched 
for problems by experimenting with future diversified scenarios as exhaustively as operating the 
next-generational technologies, earlier than its competitors (such as UMC) and even 
technology-leaders (such as IBM). Although sharing the characteristics of problemistic search 
highlighted by a behavioral theory of the firm (Cyert & March, 1963), we argued three 
conceptual differences between proactive search for problems and problemistic search. First, 
problemistic search is motivated by a particular problem and depressed by a problem-specific 
solution, whereas search for problems is motivated by making implicit problems explicit, and 
depressed by avoiding such early-detected symptoms in operation. Second, problemistic search 
proceeds on the basis of a simple-minded causality until driven to a more complex causality, 
whereas search for problems proceeds on the basis of complex model for detecting all potential 
problems in the future environment. Third, problemistic search is biased as reflecting 
organization-specific experiences and goals, whereas search for problems is biased as 
proactively scanning organizational blind spots via trans-organizational innovation beyond 
firm-boundaries. 
Because any identified problem may decrease quality or performance considerably, an 
organization must prepare a bottom-up sensitivity in problem identification and cyclical process 
for problem resolution at the earlier R&D stage. Using a fab as an example, the early 
specification of the safe-zone of parameters of new recipes is mission-critical to maintain the 
target yield for the future design-specs, especially when migrating technology platforms. For 
illustrating how the routine of acting what’s next works, the R&D Director of TSMC in charge 
of copper-interconnect highlighted a thermo-electronic experiment, whose results demonstrating 
that the low-K performance of silk material decreases substantially under high temperature. 
Such a simulated recipe was designed base on its previously manufactured IC used in projectors, 
requiring resistance to high temperature. As a result, TSMC was able to relinquish silk material 
earlier than IBM, whose silk-material patent for over 20 years became its blind spots to detect 
such a critical problem in higher resolution platforms. The success of TSMC in developing 
low-K technology using black-diamond material in 2000 was its critical milestone to transform 
from latecomer to leader.  
The routines characterized as acting what’s next suggest that it is feasible to benefit from both the 
low administrative transaction costs powered by competitive selection and trial-and-error learning 
powered by deliberate variation when macro contingencies align with micro routines. Instead of 
searching for a confined solution to a specific problem, TSMC proactively designed the 
organization-wide routines to proactively search for future problems, and subsequently expose 
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those problems in operation-like R&D labs, which are co-located and frequently interacting with 
internal operation teams and external alliance-partners. Such unique routines of acting what’s next 
also serve as an unlearning mechanism for TSMC to eliminate its organizational memory confined 
as a technology-follower (Akgün et al., 2007). Therefore, we propose Proposition 1 to explain the 
transformation of an emerging technology-leader. 
Proposition 1: The routine of acting what’s next facilitates the emergence of technological 
innovation, especially for an organization proactively co-evolving with its 
industry.  
4.4 Holistic Renewal in Modifying Phase (2002~2007) 
We specified the modifying phase of TSMC as holistic renewal since 2002, because all functions 
have integrated further with the R&D Team for migrating to next-generational platforms. SMC 
has modified three routines for strengthening its advanced process-innovation in the leading 
position. First, functioning as proactive radar screen, TSMC extended its monitoring system from 
operational lines to R&D lines, including explicit measures by the Quality & Reliability Team, as 
well as cost-tracking and forecasting by the Accounting Team. Second, functioning as end-to-end 
project coordinator, the Program-management Team under the commands of the operational 
executives coordinates cross-functional members participating in the R&D phase. Third, 
functioning as organization-wide drill, those cross-functional participants contribute to speeding 
the design of initial recipe (Version 0.1) to the commercialized recipe (Version 1.0), and the 
learning cycle for incremental improvement after the hand-over.  
Furthermore, we observed the routine of rotation among functions to facilitate the speeding up of 
technology migration. For example, during the hand-over period in R&D, approximately one third 
of R&D engineers in charge of developing a technological node were assigned to the new 
production line, as soon as it was converted from the R&D lines. For the top-management team, 
seven (35 %) of the 20 newly-hired executives during the period 2000-2006 served as VPs of 
R&D, and subsequently rotated to other functions. The average rotated functions were 1.9 for 
those 7 VPs of R&D, which was considerably higher than the average of 26 executives, 1.4 
functions (TSMC, 2000~2006). Supported by such rotation of R&D experts, those innovative 
routines of end-to-end monitoring and coordination, as well as side-by-side cross-functional 
collaboration, facilitated a two-way traffic to speed up both development of next-generational 
recipes in the R&D phase and improve yields in the operational phase. 
In addition, we observed three innovative routines for modifying from process-innovation to 
product-innovation. First, TSMC gradually modified its routines established in its extending phase 
by allocating fewer R&D resources in operational process improvements. Second, to maintain its 
leading position, TSMC faced an innovation dilemma in that its advanced process-technology was 
ahead of the design-specs of its customers. Consequently, fewer fabless and IDM customers have 
the capability to design the specs ready for test-run in the R&D phase. Third, to bridge such 
widening gaps between design-specs and manufacturing platforms, TSMC modified its subsidiary 
of design service as SIP provider to stimulate the capacity demand of its next-generational 
platforms. Without those required SIP of higher resolutions ready for simulated recipes, the 
speeding investments of TSMC in next-generational platforms may delay to harvest its economies 
of scale, particularly when over-specs are sustained.  
4.4.1 Speeding Trap 
Therefore, we found that the routines of acting what’s next, although driving technological 
innovation, also lead to a unique type of success trap: speeding trap. When TSMC accelerated the 
explicit performance-effect to proactively cope with uncertainty associated with innovation, such 
speeding also generated implicit side effects of over-specs to trap itself in a loop of over-capacity. 
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Because the incumbent SIP houses preferred to design the standard SIP in higher resolution for a 
customer, who pays the design fee, it was more difficult for TSMC to find a development partner 
to provide a simulated recipe, equipped with all necessary SIP’s for test-runs. Therefore, TSMC 
expanded the design talents by hiring and merging up to 600 design engineers in 2007, to prepare 
the in-house simulated recipe.  
Because TSMC offers free SIP to its customers as a bundled service with manufacturing, fewer 
SIP houses can expect a positive return from their investment in designing the SIP for next 
generational platforms. Unlike the pure-foundry that facilitates the burst of fabless firms, TSMC’s 
SIP-foundry bundled service has decreased the survival opportunity of dedicated SIP houses. 
Serving as a next-generational enabler, the emerging product-innvovation of SIP design may 
cause TSMC to shift out of its organizational frame of foundry business-model, with a core 
competence in process-innovation. Moreover, unlike advanced process-technologies when TSMC 
leveraged co-development with its upstream partners of fabless, SIP, and equipment vendors, its 
speeding to next-generational platforms caused TSMC to rely more on its in-house design talents 
to prepare the simulated recipes in both R&D and operational phases.  
Consequently, the future customer-base of TSMC has shrunk in both the number of customers and 
the size of orders. As a technology-leader, the routines of TSMC toward disciplinary 
over-exploration may increase the risk of its excess capacity in the next-generational platforms. 
As a latecomer, TSMC created and realized the growth opportunity as a new business-model of 
pure-foundry for itself, its customers, and its emerging economy, Taiwan, by acting what’s next to 
proactively specify and expand future demand. Applying the analytical view of inertia (Dobrev, 
Kim, & Carroll, 2003; Miller & Chen, 1994; Tripsas & Gavetti, 2000), the speeding inertia of 
TSMC toward next-generational technologies may trap it in a loop of over-exploration for 
advanced technologies and under-exploitation for mature technologies. As an emerging leader, 
when speeding innovation in such a highly disintegrated value-net, how to balance 
over-exploration versus over-exploitation becomes more challenging. Therefore, we propose 
Proposition 2 to specify a future challenge of an emerging technology-leader. 
Proposition 2: The speeding trap intensifies over-exploration of technological innovation, 
especially for an organization proactively co-evolving with its industry.  
5. Implications and Conclusions 
Derived from the macro and micro co-evolutionary dynamics of TSMC, the following section 
presents our managerial implications and conclusion. 
Our research offers three lessons for managers, including lowering barriers to imitate best 
practice for technological innovation, lowering barriers to innovate by sequential strategic 
renewals, and watching out a unique type of success trap, speeding trap. First, when 
organizational routines become more explicit to facilitate dynamic capabilities for technological 
innovation, such as acting what’s next, organizations may lower their barriers to imitate the best 
practice by developing and improving such routines. Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) used ‘best 
practice’ to represent dynamic capabilities, and indicated idiosyncrasies in their details and path 
dependence in their emergence. Our research findings specify the idiosyncratic paths of TSMC, 
and its detailed routines to breed innovation, even for a technology latecomer with almost no 
technological foundations.  
Second, the successful transformation of TSMC in developing its dynamic capability through 
sequential strategic renewals in its creating, extending, and modifying phases may help to lower 
barriers to innovate, especially for technology latecomers located in emerging economies. In each 
phase, one core innovative strategy was specified as mature process-innovation, advanced 
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process-innovation, or product-innovation, which was interlinked with multiple supporting 
organizational routines. Finally, further management attention on speeding trap is required, even 
though such a success trap is not an intentional outcome of the renewing organization. When an 
emerging leader such as TSMC changes the industry landscape from under-specs to over-specs, 
the growth driven by routines of acting what’s next may trap such a company in a loop of 
over-capacity, because of long-term disciplinary over-exploration. Consequently, the 
extraordinary success of TSMC manifests the challenges of balancing over-exploration versus 
over-exploitation when proactively integrating strategies and routines for maintaining its 
leadership in technological innovation. 
This study offers contributions in making implicit transformation mechanisms explicit through a 
qualitative approach and inductive methods. For untangling the emergence and evolution of 
technological innovation, our research framework synthesized the perspectives of dynamic 
capabilities and co-evolutionary dynamics. From the co-evolutionary perspective, the TSMC case 
demonstrates multi-motor and multi-phase strategic renewals, evolving from managed selection in 
its creating phase, hierarchical renewal in its extending phase, to holistic renewal in its modifying 
phase. The co-evolutionary dynamics of TSMC demonstrates two unique co-evolutionary paths: 
transforming from industry latecomer to technology leader and modifying process-innovation to 
product-innovation. We observed a unique type of organizational routines, acting what’s next, 
because TSMC proactively searched for problems ahead of its competitors. Nonetheless, we 
found that such routines, although driving technological innovation, lead to a unique type of 
success trap, speeding trap.  
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Appendix 1a: Co-evolutionary dynamics of managed-selection path in the creating phase of TSMC for business-model innovation since 1987 
Innovation 
Business Model 
Motors of co-evolution 
dVvSR 
Managerial intentionality  
Limited 
Renewal journey  
Co-evolutionary  
Micro co-evolution  
Facilitative 
Macro co-evolution  
Survival, new unit development 
To first 
commercialize 
the business 
model of 
dedicated 
foundry  
 
Deliberate variation:   
As ITRI Chairman, Morris 
Chang foresaw foundry as 
the optimal option for 
Taiwan as a semiconductor 
latecomer.  
Vicarious selection: 
In 1987, convinced by Dr. 
Chang’s proposal, ITRI 
and Philips found an 
international JV, TSMC, as 
the first dedicated foundry. 
By contrast, Intel, NEC, 
and TI did not accept such 
an IJV proposal. 
As top management, TSMC 
founders created a strategic 
context for nurturing and 
selecting promising 
initiatives, which were 
confined in manufacturing 
diversified chip-designs and 
developing next generational 
process technology. In late 
1980s, TSMC did not receive 
sufficient orders from local 
designers because of its 
over-advanced facility, and 
from foreign designers 
because of a lack of 
confidence in a new foundry.  
Both TSMC founders 
renewed their current 
routine in forming 
TSMC. Foundry was 
selected because of the 
mixture of market 
selection, based on 
Taiwan as latecomer, 
and managerial 
adaptation, based on 
limited growth of the 
first semiconductor firm 
in Taiwan, UMC (an 
IDM span-off from ITRI 
in 1982), and exploiting 
Philips‘ technology 
assets in emerging 
economy. 
TSMC founders 
amplified technological 
variety in foundry by 
speeding up the 
delivery cycle-time and 
the roll-out of 
multi-generational 
nodes. Therefore, the 
bottom-up renewal 
initiatives focused on 
shorter cycle-time from 
industry standard of 12 
to 4 weeks, and higher 
yield in manufacturing.  
For a foundry, a fab of a 
particular technology-platform 
may serve as unit. Market 
selects the most efficient fab. 
TSMC maintained 1st position, 
even after UMC transformed 
its business-model from IDM 
to foundry in 1995, and the 
technology leader, IBM, 
span-off its fab as a foundry in 
2002. The foundry has changed 
the industry landscape, where 
less incumbent fabs invest in 
excess capacity, and more 
fabless firms are found or 
spin-off from downstream 
chip-users. 
To transform its 
business model 
to eFoundry 
(service-oriented 
firm)* 
Deliberate variation:  
TSMC Chairman and 
CEO, Dr. Chang, foresaw 
foundry as service- 
oriented business. 
Vicarious selection:  
Stepping on technology 
foundation by learning 
routines, TSMC 
re-engineered its 
manufacturing focus 
toward service-oriented 
eFoundry in late 1990s. 
As top management, Dr. 
Chang created a strategic 
context to improve flexibility 
and transparency for serving 
diversified customer 
requirements.  
As semiconductor mentality 
against service, most TSMC 
engineers transformed their 
manufacturing inertia.  
The eFoundry was 
selected based on the 
mixture of market 
selection, because of the 
higher demand for 
advanced or complex 
chips, and managerial 
adaptation, because of 
the higher risk of excess 
capacity if relying only 
on mature technology. 
Top management 
amplified demand 
variety in serving 
customers by a 
collection of 
Internet-based 
programs, such as 
TSMC On-Line. 
Therefore, the 
bottom-up renewal 
initiatives focused on 
methods to achieve 
higher customer 
satisfaction.  
TSMC developed a new unit of 
virtual fab called eFoundry, 
allowing customers and TSMC 
to cooperate in design, 
logistics, and engineering. 
Market selected eFoundry 
because it worked as in-house 
fab. The eFoundry has changed 
the industry landscape, because 
such renewal into customer- 
oriented culture facilitated 
TSMC to transform into 
technology leader. 
Data Source: The contents are organized based on archival data and field interviews by the framework adopted from Volberda and Lewin (2003).  
Note*: Please refer to the TSMC case of Stanford Graduate School of Business for the details of eFoundry (Shneorson et al., 2006). 
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Appendix 1b: Co-evolutionary dynamics of managed-selection path in the creating phase of TSMC for mature process-innovation since 1987 
Innovation 
Mature 
Process 
Motors of co-evolution 
dVvSR 
Managerial 
intentionality 
Limited 
Renewal journey  
Co-evolutionary  
Micro co-evolution  
Facilitative 
Macro co-evolution  
Survival, new unit 
development 
To transfer 
fab-facility 
and building 
teams from its 
local founder 
-- ITRI 
Deliberate variation:   
As government-sponsored 
institute, ITRI built the first 4”, 
6”, and 8” fabs in Taiwan for 
spinning-off to private entity.  
Vicarious selection: 
TSMC was selected because it 
was expected to maximize the 
semiconductor growth in 
Taiwan. 
As top management, 
ITRI created a 
strategic context for 
TSMC to learn to 
design and build 6” 
and 8” fabs. TSMC 
did not develop the 
next- generational fab 
(12”) until 1999. 
ITRI renewed its fab-transfer 
routine from leasing its 6” 
Fab 1 in 1987, to bidding its 
8” fab in 1994. ITRI also 
transferred 150 team- 
members building 6” fab to 
TSMC, and 330 of 8” fab to 
Vanguard, a bidding 
consortium of 14 firms lead 
by TSMC. 
ITRI amplified variety to upgrade 
fabs from 6” to 8” wafers for 
memory IC. Therefore, TSMC’s 
bottom-up renewal initiatives 
focused on upgrading 
resolution-nodes from 1.5 to 0.15 
micron, and building 2 other fabs of 
6” in 1990 & 1992, and 6 fabs of 8” 
in 1995-2000, for capacity 
expansion. 
The 10 fabs built based on 
the mature technology 
transferred from ITRI, 
offered 11 nodes, ranging 
from 1.5 to 0.15 micron. 
Fab 1 was decommissioned 
in 2002 when the lease 
expired, and Fab 7 in 
2006, replaced with 12” 
capacity. 
To transfer 
mature 
technology 
from its 
foreign 
founder – 
Philips 
Deliberate variation:  
Philips transferred its volume 
technology to TSMC, and paid a 
loyalty fee. TSMC also entered 
the technical cooperation 
agreement with ITRI, free of 
charge. 
Vicarious selection: 
To protect its technology assets, 
Philips licensed mature 
technology to TSMC under 
certain equity criteria. 
As top management, 
Philips created a 
strategic context to 
protect its latecomer 
JV by granting its 
patents and 
cross-licensing with 
others for free if its 
equity remained at a 
certain level. 
As technology leader, Philips 
renewed its growth-routine to 
license to its latecomer JV 
based on the mixture of 
market selection, driven by 
sharing costs of capacity 
expansion, and managerial 
adaptation, driven by 
exploiting its technology 
assets. 
Philips amplified variety for TSMC 
to reduce its dependence on 
licensed-technology when paying 
royalty. In 1997, Philips agreed to 
reduce the royalty term and deduct 
any license fees and defense costs 
that TSMC paid to any third parties 
from such royalty payment, starting 
from 2002. 
In 1999, Philips and 
TSMC found a JV in 
Singapore, Systems on 
Silicon fab, based on the 
successful alliance as 
TSMC.  
To catch up 
ITRS 
roadmap* by 
operational 
improvements 
Deliberate variation:  
TSMC focused on 
exact-copying the mature 
technology by 1999. 
Vicarious selection: 
As latecomer, TSMC had to 
catch up to a two to one 
generational gap behind ITRS 
roadmap. 
Top management of 
TSMC created a 
strategic context to 
focus on incremental 
improvements mainly 
on yield, led by the 
operation function. 
TSMC renewed its learning 
routines based on the mixture 
of market selection, driven by 
lower average costs of next- 
generational nodes, and 
managerial adaptation, 
driven by exploiting its 
capacity. 
Top management amplified variety 
among technology nodes. Therefore, 
its bottom-up initiatives focused on 
learning by undertaking more 
advanced recipes provided from 
equipment-suppliers and 
design-customers. 
This catching-up foundry 
changed the industry 
landscape. More fabless 
firms advanced their 
design competence closer 
to IDM. A number of 
IDM’s also outsourced 
advanced design when 
their capacity was 
constrained. 
Data Source: The contents are organized based on archival data and field interviews by the framework adopted from Volberda and Lewin (2003).  
Note*: ITRS (International Technology Roadmap for Semiconductors) roadmap is the fifteen-year assessment of the future technology requirements of the 
semiconductor industry. These future-needs drive present-day strategies and development among manufacturers’ research facilities, universities, and national 
labs.  
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Appendix 2: Co-evolutionary dynamics of hierarchical-renewal path in the extending phase of TSMC for advanced process-innovation since 1999 
Innovation 
Advanced 
Process 
Motors of co-evolution 
 
Administrative 
Managerial 
intentionality 
Concentrated in top 
management 
Renewal journey 
 
Teleological 
Micro co-evolution  
 
Autocratic 
Macro co-evolution  
 
Local change 
To recruit R&D 
talents from the 
technology 
leaders 
(unlearning by 
expanding 
organizational 
slack) 
TSMC expanded its base of 
employees from 5908 in 1998 
to 15880 in 2000 (App. B). In 
the top-management team, 20 
(77 %) of 26 executives were 
hired after 1996; 15 (75 %) of 
the newly-hired staff worked 
for technology-leaders. 
TSMC offered competitive 
bonus scheme and decision 
empowerment to attract the 
“top-guns” of both experienced 
and young talents. 
Routine of expanding 
slack, spreading out 
from R&D talents: 
Among the 20 
newly-hired executives, 
7 (35 %) served as VP of 
R&D, and subsequently 
rotated to other 
functions. The average 
rotated functions were 
1.9 for those VP’s of 
R&D, considerably 
higher than that of all 26 
executives who only 
rotated 1.4 functions.  
Experimenting mixed 
generational slack: The 
R&D talents from 
technology leaders hired 
and trained young talents for 
building an independent 
R&D team, instead of 
learning from the founders. 
As a comparison, Intel 
requires an engineer to have 
a minimal of 15-years 
experience before joining 
R&D; whereas the majority 
of TSMC’s R&D entrants 
are new Ph.D graduates. 
TSMC started to invest in 
developing next- 
generational technology 
since 1993. The current 
routine emerged from the 
combinations of senior 
experts’ experiences in 
diversified technology 
leaders and juniors’ fast 
experiments of 
diversified practice. 
Following ITRS roadmap, most 
semiconductor players invested in 
the development of 0.13-node on 
12” wafer with two major 
technology migrations to copper- 
interconnect and low-K. Those 
who built the new capacity 
producing 12” wafer were 
expected to enjoy the cost-down 
benefits associated with such 
migration. Using a memory 
product of DRAM as an example, 
the average cost of 6” wafer was 
180 % that of an 8” wafer. 
To decline IBM’s 
offer of 
technology 
transfer 
(unlearning by 
giving up 
learning 
opportunity) 
As the world leader in 
copper-interconnect, IBM 
offered TSMC to transfer its 
technology in 1999, at a fee of 
USD 100 million. During 
one-year evaluation period, the 
majority non-R&D executives 
of TSMC supported the 
acceptance of this offer because 
of a lack of proven records of 
self-development. 
The major concern to accept 
IBM’s offer was competitive 
timing. TSMC estimated 
one-year lag behind IBM when 
R&D lines at IBM needed to 
transfer to operation lines at 
TSMC.  
Routine of transforming 
to technology leader, 
spreading out from 
independent R&D: 
TSMC counter-offered 
to IBM to allow two 
developmental sites, to 
ensure that the emerging 
R&D routine did not 
change twice (from 
Hsin-chu to Fishkill, 
and back). As expected, 
IBM rejected this 
counter-offer.  
Experimenting independent 
R&D without technology 
transfer: Although the 
majority preferred 
acceptance, and internal 
debates lasted for one year, 
TSMC rejected IBM’s offer. 
The top- management of 
TSMC was committed to 
establishing an independent 
R&D for long-term 
competitive advantage. 
TSMC rejected IBM’s offer 
TSMC started to invest in 
developing next- 
generational technology 
since 1993. The size of 
R&D team grew from 
approximately 300 in 
1999 to 1000 in 2006. 
The R&D routine 
emerged from the 
combinations of senior 
experts’ experiences in 
various technology 
leaders and juniors’ fast 
experiments of 
diversified recipes. 
Upon TSMC’s rejection, IBM 
turned to TSMC’s main 
competitor, UMC, which ranked as 
2nd foundry with a capacity of 82 
% of that of TSMC in 1999. 
Without lengthy discussion, UMC 
accepted this offer with a mandate 
to beat TSMC in next generation, 
and sent 50 young R&D 
employees to Fishkill to learn from 
IBM. However, UMC 
discontinued this alliance because 
of a crucial flaw in IBM’s low-K 
technology of silk, and re-built 
another R&D team in Hsin-chu to 
develop 0.13-node. 
 
 
    (To be continued on the page 19th) 
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Appendix 2: Co-evolutionary dynamics of hierarchical-renewal path in the extending phase of TSMC for advanced process-innovation since 1999 
    (To continue) 
To proactively 
search for 
problems for 
detecting 
potential defects 
as early as 
possible 
(unlearning 
existing 
operation) 
Unlike the R&D of operation 
team focusing on incremental 
improvements, the mission of 
R&D was the early detection of 
all possible problems of future 
recipe after migrating to 
next-generational node.  
When a problem was identified, 
the whole organization worked 
together to develop the solution 
(future recipe), as early as R&D 
phase. 
Routine of 
search-for-problems 
spreading out from 
R&D: When migrating 
from a specific 
resolution-node to the 
next, the parameters of 
each 300~500 steps 
required adjustment to 
balance performance 
and defect. Moreover, a 
dedicated foundry such 
as TSMC must 
accommodate wider 
design diversity than 
most leaders, such as 
Intel. 
To save the experimental 
costs and speed the 
developmental process from 
the version 0.1 recipes of 
R&D lines to version 1.0 of 
first operation line, the R&D 
team designed minimal runs 
of parameter-sets targeting 
to expose all potential 
problems when 
manufacturing the recipes of 
next-generational node.  
TSMC maintained a 
speeding path as a 
migration to the next 
resolution-node every 
two years. Such a path 
required unlearning the 
operational recipes 
accumulated from the 
previous technologies. 
During the period of 1987 
to 2005, TSMC migrated 
from initial 1.5-node to 
another 10 nodes, up to 
0.09 micron. 
When launching 0.35-node in 
1997, TSMC lagged 1 year behind 
the advanced leaders. It caught-up 
to 6 months for 0.25-node in 1998, 
and up to no lag for 0.18-node 
in1999. After the unlearning 
period, TSMC maintained a 
position of at least 3~6 months 
ahead of ITRS roadmap, which 
attests to its successful 
transformation from technology 
latecomer to technology leader. 
  
To co-develop 
with customers 
and suppliers 
(unlearning 
existing designs 
and equipment) 
Unlike the creating phase, when 
TSMC learned from its 
customers and suppliers, it 
started to form co- development 
partnership for the advanced 
process technologies of 0.13 
node on 12” wafer.   
Using the leading equipment 
vendor as an example, Applied 
Materials (AM) co-developed 
with technology leaders and 
subsequently sold the 
equipment with proven recipes 
to TSMC. The co- develop- 
ment model was formed 
through the joint-project with 
TSMC for developing low-K 
technology by black-diamond 
material in 1998. 
Routine of 
search-for-problems 
spreading out to 
partners: 
TSMC’s selected 
co-development 
partners also 
participated in the 
search for future 
problems. When IBM 
focused on low-K 
technology by silk, 
which provides the 
lowest K in lab, TSMC 
simultaneously tested 
the recipes by silk and 
alternative materials.  
Joint-experiments for future 
recipes with partner: Based 
on the parameters from the 
design for projector IC, 
TSMC conducted the 
thermoelectricity-test on all 
alternatives, and found the 
substantial problem of 
leading material, silk, 
earlier than IBM. IBM 
failed to discover such 
over-heat problem of silk 
before it was able to change 
to alternative materials. 
Without taking any 
technology for granted, 
TSMC extended such 
proactive search for 
problems beyond its 
firm-boundaries to its 
upstream partners of 
equipment suppliers and 
downstream partners of 
fabless designers. TSMC 
maintained such 
co-development routine 
until the gaps of IP in 
next- generation were 
excessively large to 
bridge. 
Since TSMC co-developed the 
recipes of 0.13-node and built the 
fab-capacity earlier than others in 
2001, 8 IDM’s, including Intel, 
AT&T, &TI, adopted a new 
outsourcing approach, called 
“phase-in.” They outsourced their 
new recipes to TSMC, which did 
not volume-produce in their own 
fabs. The success of phase-in not 
only secured TSMC’s future 
orders, but also changed the 
industry landscape. A number of 
IDM’s stopped upgrading their 
fabs for advanced technology. 
Moreover, TSMC started to serve 
as the certification-site of 
advanced process technologies for 
semiconductor industry. 
Sonya H. Wen & Ji-Ren Lee                           Submitted on October 21, 2013 
20                                                                                              © Science and Education Centre of North America 
Appendix 3a: Co-evolutionary dynamics of holistic-renewal path in the modifying phase of TSMC for advanced process-innovation since 2002 
Innovation  
Advanced 
Process 
Motors of co-evolution 
Collective sense-making 
Managerial intentionality  
 
Organization wide  
Renewal journey 
 
Cyclical 
Micro co-evolution  
 
Transformational 
Macro co-evolution  
 
Core change  
To extend 
monitoring 
system in R&D 
lines (as radar 
screen) 
The detection of potential 
problems (disease) requires 
widespread organizational 
awareness.  
For a foundry business, 
consistent high die yield is 
not only a high quality 
indicator, but also a low cost 
driver. 
Routine of early-detection: 
As early-signals, TSMC 
extended monitoring system 
on operations into R&D 
lines, including explicit 
measures by Quality & 
Reliability team, and 
cost-tracking and forecasting 
by Accounting team. 
The whole organization of 
TSMC was exposed to 
experiments of advanced 
process technologies. Such 
early involvement of non- 
R&D teams allowed them to 
discover potential problems 
that may be neglected by 
R&D engineers. 
The same system 
independently monitored 
the end-to-end process 
from early development, 
hand-over from R&D to 
operational lines, to 
operational improvement.  
Since launching a 0.13-node in 
2002, TSMC emerged as the 
leader in advanced process 
technology to maintain a 
leading edge of 3 to 6 months 
ahead of its competitors. 
Serving as a certification site, 
TSMC’s co-development team 
specified the safe-zones of 
each manufacturing process.  
To timely deliver 
by end-to-end 
coordination 
(Operation-lead) 
The development of future 
recipes required 
disciplinarily coordination of 
end-to-end participation. 
Filling new capacity 
(immunity) requires timely 
delivery of volume 
production ahead of its 
competitors. 
Routine of timely-delivery: 
TSMC set up a new matrix 
team, called program 
management, under 
operation VP and 
subsequently upgraded it to 
CEO for next-generational 
development and major 
operational improvement. Its 
main mission was to push all 
project members to follow 
the targeted time-line. 
The routine of program 
management emerged from 
weekly lunch-meetings when 
developing 0.13-node. The 
founding staff of program 
management was transferred 
from Marketing, R&D, and 
Operation functions. The 
rotation of managers and 
engineers among these three 
and other roles is a common 
practice in TSMC. 
The timely delivery of the 
next-generational 
operation not only 
influenced TSMC’s 
profits, but also directly 
influenced its team and 
individual bonuses. 
Therefore, all the project 
members prioritize the 
target time-line.  
Because the source of defects 
differ from one-node to 
another, and from one 
combination of design-specs to 
another, TSMC’s 
co-development team 
experimented with all existing 
combinations and simulated 
sets as early as possible, even 
before the equipment was 
produced.  
To smoothly 
hand-over by 
side-by-side 
collaboration 
(organizational 
wide drill) 
The application of future 
recipes in volume operation 
requires widespread 
organizational collaboration.  
Because of the cost-down 
benefits, the profit margin of 
next- generational node is 
higher. 
Routine of smooth 
hand-over: In addition to 
early involvement of 
non-R&D teams in 
development stage, 
approximately 1/3 of R&D 
engineers were assigned to 
support the operation lines 
during hand-over period, and 
formed projects for 
improvement after 
hand-over. 
The job-rotation is two-way 
traffic. The emerging trend in 
which a number of 
operational managers and 
engineers rotate to R&D 
team further blurred the 
boundaries between current 
and next-generation 
technologies. Such two-way 
rotation also facilitates 
cross-functional 
communication and 
coordination. 
The future recipe 
co-developed by 
end-to-end involvement 
of TSMC with its 
upstream and 
downstream partners can 
be smoothly applied to 
the operation lines that 
are ready for 
improvement. 
TSMC’s role as certification 
site has changed the industry 
landscape. First, the equipment 
suppliers rely on TSMC’s 
specs to produce equipment for 
advanced process 
technologies. Second, the 
advanced fabless firms have no 
alternative but to follow 
TSMC’s design-recipes by 
sharing R&D costs. 
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Appendix 3b: Co-evolutionary dynamics of holistic-renewal path in the modifying phase of TSMC for product-innovation since 2002 
Innovation  
Product 
Motors of co-evolution 
Collective sense-making 
Managerial intentionality  
Organization wide  
Renewal journey 
Cyclical 
Micro co-evolution  
Transformational 
Macro co-evolution  
Core change  
To allocate less 
resources in 
operational 
improvements  
The sales team proposed 
technological improvement plan 
based on the current customers’ 
pending demand for mature 
technology, such as aluminum- 
interconnect. 
The competitors, such as UMC 
and Charters, which were behind 
TSMC in advanced nodes, 
focused their customization 
efforts on mature technology. 
The sales team required 
three years to convince the 
top-management to allocate 
R&D resources in 
customization of mature 
technology. During this 
period, a number of 
customers switched their 
orders to competitors of 
TSMC. 
TSMC allocated 
more R&D resources 
to advanced rather 
than mature 
technology, to 
confine the scope of 
experiments in future 
specs.    
The business 
opportunities embedded 
in mature technology may 
be under-exploited when 
the whole organization 
invests insufficient 
resources and, more 
important, pays more 
attention to future demand 
than the pending demand 
of current customer base.  
Fewer fabless designers 
were able to catch up with 
TSMC’s speeding in 
advanced process 
technology. Conversely, 
more low-end customers 
emerged who may not be 
satisfied with TSMC’s 
service in regard to cost and 
quality.  
To create 
problems when 
process 
technology over 
design-specs 
(Innovator’s 
Dilemma) 
The further ahead TSMC’s 
advanced process technology, the 
wider the gap of the 
semiconductor value net, which 
facilitated the IC-design on 
next-generational node. 
The cost to design on 
next-generational node was 
higher than the cost-down 
benefits, which justified 
migration. 
When TSMC became the 
dominating leader in 
prototyping and 
verification, time-to-market 
was driven more by 
TSMC’s new capacity 
rather than the demand of 
its customer for next 
generational technology. 
Experimenting with a 
new competence: 
Since 1991, TSMC’s 
design service has 
focused on standard 
cell solution for the 
mature technology. 
Currently, it switches 
to next- generational 
nodes.  
To enable the 
next-generational nodes, 
TSMC tripled its design 
service team up to 600 in 
2007. It is in-charge of 
designing the future 
recipes, instead of 
consolidating from its 
design partners. 
Market selects the timeliest 
efficient firm. Similar to the 
founding condition of 
TSMC, offering more 
advanced technology than 
its local designers could 
afford, TSMC currently 
offers more advanced 
technology than all the 
designers could afford. 
To convert 
design service to 
IP house to cope 
with the curse of 
economy of 
scale (drifting 
out of foundry) 
TSMC’s customer, SONY, 
postponed its orders on 
next-generational nodes because 
standard IP was not available. 
The current IP houses did not 
invest resources in those IP’s 
because more time was required 
for the IP market to make such an 
investment profitable. 
Because of speeding the 
capacity building on 
next-generational platform, 
TSMC faced a dilemma to 
delay the time-line of 
capacity ramp-up or speed 
up the design competence 
by proactively designing 
the advanced IP in house. 
Experimenting a 
detour from foundry:   
Serving as a capacity 
enabler, TSMC’s 
design service 
designed future 
recipes and 
associated IPs, such 
as input/output and 
MP3. 
The expansion of design 
service extended TSMC’s 
core competence from 
process technology to 
IP-design, which is a 
necessary complementary 
competence to fill the new 
capacity of 
next-generational nodes. 
Fewer IP houses can 
survive when the standard 
cells in advanced 
technology are provided by 
TSMC to its customers free 
of charge. The disintegrated 
value-net, enabled by 
TSMC since 1987, may 
virtually converge in 
advanced nodes in the 
future. 
 
